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Drugs & Thugs: Funding Terrorism through Narcotics
Trafficking
Abstract
To date, much of the literature on the financing of terrorism and insurgency has focused at
the macro-level on groups involved in financing their organizations through involvement in
the drug trade. This paper discusses some of those implications, but argues that to better
understand the threat faced by the new generation of jihadists in the West, security forces
and intelligence services must also look at the micro-level of how lower level trafficking,
drug dealing and petty criminal activity, combined with prison radicalization and ties to the
black market and illicit underworld, combine to present a new spin on a longstanding
threat. To be sure, the micro-level is even more difficult to counter, given already poor
community-police cooperation and relations in the marginalized communities throughout
the West. Further, the threat from drug trafficking at the micro-level can be equally as
nefarious, as smaller cells are given greater autonomy to finance plots, recruit new
members and ultimately conduct attacks in developed democracies. The paper concludes
with some policy recommendations geared toward helping host-nations build capacity in
critical areas, including law enforcement and intelligence, from the local to the state to the
federal level.
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Introduction
Violent-non-state actors, including terrorists and insurgents, are constantly
seeking new ways to fund their organizations.1 Following the end of the Cold
War, superpowers withdrew their financing of proxies, making states weaker
and more susceptible to attack. Similarly, terrorist and insurgent groups that
previously relied on state financing were forced to either become criminals or
fade away. To account for the newfound dearth of funding, non-state actors
developed broad portfolios of illicit activities. At various points, al-Qaida
relied heavily on funding from wealthy patrons in the Gulf and charities that
served as fronts for more nefarious purposes.2 In Southeast Asia, kidnapping
for ransom by Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) are further evidence of the blurred lines between criminality and
terrorism.3 Terrorist groups will engage in nearly any activity that generates a
profit and have demonstrated an ability to adapt to losses in one area by
aggressively expanding into new markets. When the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) began to generate lower profits from the sale of black market oil,
it supplemented these losses by trafficking antiquities, managing fish farms,
and running car dealerships.4
Narcotics trafficking remains one of the most common and most lucrative
forms of criminality on which terrorists rely in order to finance their
organizations and activities. Due to high pecuniary value and the low volume
to value ratio of smuggling and trafficking illicit narcotics (cocaine, ecstasy,
heroin, hashish, marijuana, methamphetamine, opiates, etc.) and the
chemical precursors required to manufacture some of these drugs, this
criminal activity is an attractive one for terrorists or insurgents.5 In addition
to money, the narcotics trade in drug-producing countries has the potential to
provide terrorists with recruits and sympathizers among “impoverished,
Clarke, Colin P., Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency and
Irregular Warfare, (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2015).
2 Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” in Terrorism
Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Redwood City, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2007), 122–123; Matthew Levitt, “Al-Qa’ida’s Finances:
Evidence of Organizational Decline? CTC Sentinel, 1:5 (April 2008); and Juan Miguel del
Cid Gomez, “A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates,”
Perspectives on Terrorism, 4:4 (October 2010).
3 Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the
Lines,” SAIS Review, 24:1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 52.
4 Stephen Kalin, “Islamic State Turns To Selling Fish, Cars To Offset Oil Losses: Report,”
Reuters, April 28, 2016, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisisislamicstate-finances-idUSKCN0XP2CV.
5 For more on the network aspect of drug trafficking, see Phil Williams, “The Nature of
Drug-Trafficking Networks,” Current History (April 1998): 154–159.
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neglected, isolated farmers” who can help cultivate drug crops while also
serving as a bulwark against pro-government groups and anti-drug
campaigns.6
To date, much of the literature on the financing of terrorism and insurgency
has focused at the transnational-level on groups involved in financing their
organizations through involvement in the drug trade.7 This article discusses
some of those implications, but argues that to better understand the threat
faced by the new generation of jihadists in the West, security forces and
intelligence services must also look at how lower-level trafficking, drug
dealing, and petty criminal activity, at the local level, combined with prison
radicalization and ties to the black market and illicit underworld, combine to
present a new spin on a longstanding threat. To be sure, the local level is even
more difficult to counter, given already poor community-police cooperation
and relations in the marginalized communities throughout the West. Further,
the threat from drug trafficking at the local level can be equally as nefarious,
as smaller cells are given greater autonomy to finance plots, recruit new
members and ultimately conduct attacks in developed democracies.

Involvement in the Drug Trade
Involvement in the narcotics trade can bring together terrorist or insurgent
groups and drug cartels.8 Furthermore, the demise of the latter could present
opportunities for terrorists or insurgents to fill the void, as in Colombia when
FARC took over some of the territory previously controlled by the Medellin
and Cali cartels in the 1990s. Other times, as with the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) and its drug trafficking activities in Europe, rather than
cooperate with traditional criminal enterprises, insurgent or terrorist groups
seek to drive them out of the market to supplant them themselves.9 Finally,
as we have seen with the relationship between drug traffickers and Sendero
Rollins, John and Liana Sun-Wyler, Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign
Policy Issues for Congress, CRS Report R41004, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress,
2012): 10, available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf. See also,
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs,
(Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
7 Victor Asal et al., “When Terrorists Go Bad: Analyzing Terrorist Organizations’
Involvement in Drug Smuggling,” International Studies Quarterly, 59:1 (March 2015):
112-123. See also, Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist
Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation, (University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).
8 Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 28:3 (2005): 246.
9 Phil Williams, “Insurgencies and Organized Crime,” in Drug Trafficking, Violence, and
Instability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,
(April 2012): 32.
6
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Luminoso in Peru, the dominant party in the relationship can change over
time. In the 1990s, a powerful (and brutal) Sendero held sway, while more
recently, especially in the Valley of the Apurimac and Ene River (VRAE), the
insurgents have been keen to play a more secondary role.10
Narcotics remain both the most common and most lucrative form of
organized crime used by terrorist groups, including well-known traffickers
like the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),11 Basque Homeland and Liberty or
ETA in Spain, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).12 Profits
derived from drug trafficking have enabled groups like FARC to obtain
sophisticated weapons and communications technology.13 More recently, an
investigation in Australia uncovered 40 separate money laundering
operations in that country, one of which delivered proceeds from drug
trafficking to Hezbollah.14 The cultivation of illicit crops like poppy or coca is
labor-intensive and provides employment to hundreds of thousands to
millions of people in particular countries, including Afghanistan and
Colombia, respectively.15 Producer countries are often the least profitable
part of the process; the lion’s share of earnings is garnered by those who
refine and market the drugs.16

Historical Examples
The examples of insurgent and terrorist groups relying on criminal activities
to fund their organizations, particularly drug trafficking, are abundant in both
historical and contemporary cases. Moreover, no single typology of terrorist
or insurgent group can claim the mantle of relying on narcotics to finance its
activities. From the Cold War era to modern times, the examples span ethnonationalist groups, separatists, Marxist-oriented organizations and religious
groups alike, making it difficult to predict which groups may be more or less
likely to rely on this method of raising funds.
Ibid., 33.
Dishman, “Leaderless Nexus,” 43.
12 Sanderson, “Blurring the Lines,” 52. See also Williams, “Insurgencies and Organized
Crime,” 44.
13 Sanderson, “Blurring the Lines,” 51.
14 Nick McKenzie and Richard Baker, “Terrorists Taking Cut of Millions in Drug Money,”
The Sydney Morning Herald, January 23, 2014, available
at:http://www.smh.com.au/national/terrorists-taking-cut-of-millions-in-drug-money20140122-3196s.html.
15 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Fighting the Nexus,” in Drug Trafficking, Violence, and
Instability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,
(April 2012): 5.
16 Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli, “Methods Not Motives: Implications of the
Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism, Police Practice and
Research, 3:4 (2002): 313.
10
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Among the most prolific terrorist organizations to rely on narcotics trafficking
to fund its activities was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri
Lanka. Involvement in the drug trade first became apparent as early as 1984
when Swiss police reported that Tamils were responsible for trafficking
approximately 20 percent of the heroin coming into the country.17 The “Tamil
connection” in Switzerland, as it came to be known, was eventually
dismantled by the police, although the drug market in Sri Lanka itself
expanded, with an estimated 100,000 users by the end of the 1990s.18 Italian
police also broke up several Tamil heroin rings throughout the 1980s. Sri
Lanka’s geographic proximity to the Golden Triangle of Laos, Myanmar, and
Thailand, combined with the LTTE’s advanced maritime capabilities made
heroin trafficking an obvious racket for the group to pursue. The LTTE also
extended operations into Pakistan, where its members linked up with
notorious Indian crime boss Dawood Ibrahim and his “D-Company” gang.
They used the port city of Karachi to solidify a foothold in South Asia and
diversify smuggling activities to include humans, in addition to heroin.19
Other groups, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), had an
ambiguous relationship with the drug trade over time. In Republican
neighborhoods, there was a tacit understanding that one had to pay
“revolutionary” taxes to avoid drawing the ire of the Provos and there exists
widespread speculation that the PIRA profited from the selling of drugs,
although the group was not actively smuggling and trafficking narcotics
itself.20 Still, some PIRA members did “take a cut” of the profits earned by
drug dealers operating on territory dominated by the group. At various
points, the PIRA was also known to “ride shotgun,” or provide armed escort
on international drug shipments.21

Weiss, Gordon, The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil
Tigers, (London, England: Bodley Head, 2011), 89.
18 Williams, “Insurgencies and Organized Crime,” 46.
19 Phil Williams, “Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or
Transformation?” in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, (London, England:
Routledge, 2008): 139.
20 There is a fierce debate in the literature over whether or not the PIRA engaged in drug
trafficking. Because a consensus has never been reached, this paper eschews further
analysis of the issue. For a thoughtful and balanced analysis of the debate, see John
Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing Green Card—Financing the Provisional IRA: Part I,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, 11:2 (Summer 1999): 2; 24–30, available at:
http://www.academia.edu/3882176/Playing_the_Green_Card__Financing_the_Provisional_IRA_Part_1.
21 “Riding shotgun” is a term used for providing an armed escort on international drug
shipments. See Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the Green Card, Part 1,” 8.
17
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Two well-known terrorist groups in the Middle East have both been
associated with involvement in the drug trade at various points: Hezbollah
and Hamas. Known Hezbollah supporters and brothers, Ali Farhat and
Hassan Farhat, were accused of trafficking cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, in
collaboration with a Nigerian drug dealer in possession of a Canadian
immigration document.22 More broadly, Hezbollah has also dealt
methamphetamine and in the last several years has been receptive to a
burgeoning relationship with Mexican drug cartels. Hezbollah operatives
have been accused of trafficking in arms, drugs, and women. Indeed,
Hezbollah operatives have been tied to drug operations in Poland, Hungary,
Moldova, the Balkans, and Romania.23
Hamas has taken advantage of the Muslim diaspora in South America’s semilawless tri-border area, a region known for money laundering, drug
trafficking, and a host of other illicit and unsavory activities.24 In the triborder area of Latin America, it is well-known that Hamas (perhaps
emulating Hezbollah) has established partnerships with various drug
trafficking organizations.25 The group has also been involved with drugs in
the United States, at least on the margins–a pseudoephedrine smuggling
scam in the Midwest United States involved bank accounts tied to Hamas.26
As the noose was tightened around charities that funded al-Qaida after 9/11,
the group attempted to diversify its revenue sources, to include garnering
money earned through drug trafficking, particularly through an alliance with
the IMU in Central Asia, but also in North Africa by one of its affiliates. In the
latter case, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been linked to
Colombian cocaine traffickers in a quid pro quo relationship that brings cash
to the terrorists while providing the traffickers with unfettered access (and in
some cases, heavily armed escorts) across the desert region between
Mauritania, Mali, and Algeria, where narcotics transit through on their way to
a growing European market. In addition to money obtained through

Levitt, Matthew, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God,
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 320.
23 Ibid., 227.
24 Sanderson, “Blurring the Lines,” 53.
25 Clare Ribando Seelke et al., “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking
and U.S. Counterdrug Programs,” CRS Report R41215, (Washington, D.C.: Library of
Congress, 2011): 6, available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf.
26 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah: Financing Terror Through Criminal Enterprise,”
Testimony presented to United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, May 25, 2005: 10, available at:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/hezbollah-testimony-05252005.pdf.
22
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kidnapping for ransom (KFR), AQIM earns significant sums of money from
trafficking cocaine and synthetic drugs between Spain and Algeria.27
Perhaps the most prolific terrorist organization associated with drug
trafficking today is the Afghan Taliban. On narcotics, the Taliban’s position
has evolved considerably throughout the years and at different points the
group has knowingly suppressed the cultivation of poppy in Afghanistan in
order to manipulate the international market price. At one point, a Taliban
ban on poppy cultivation suppressed the supply by 90 percent, thus
increasing the value of the group’s stocks by ten times the price.28 While the
Taliban flip flopped back and forth on its stance toward involvement in the
illicit narcotics trade between 1994 and 2001, its position since then has been
consistent for the most part.29 Once the insurgency began in earnest, Taliban
fighters made a series of shrewd maneuvers, including the advancement of
loans to opium farmers in order to obtain their backing whilst simultaneously
ensuring a future source of revenue.30 Keeping in line with its renewed
offensive to win “hearts and minds,” the Taliban now actively promotes the
growing of poppy and provides protection to farmers growing the crop.31

From Local to Global and Back Again
A study by Emilie Oftedal of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
(FFI) looked at data on the financing of 40 jihadi cells that have plotted
attacks against European targets between 1994 and 2013 and concluded that
the second most common method of funding for these attacks (in 28% of
cases analyzed) was illicit trade (which included drugs, cars, forged
documents, and weapons).32 Three-quarters of the plots cost less than
Gomez, “Financial Profile of Al-Qaeda,”12–13.
Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Kicking the Opium Habit? Afghanistan’s Drug Economy and
Politics Since the 1980s,” Conflict, Security, and Development, 6:2, (Summer 2006): 127149, available at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Kicking%20the%20opium%20habit%20Afgh
anistan%20s%20drug%20economy%20and%20politics%20since%20the%201980s.pdf.
29 One exception was when Taliban fighters destroyed fields of opium poppies in eastern
Afghanistan, the first time since 2001. Emma Graham-Harrison, “Taliban Destroy Poppy
Fields in Surprise Clampdown on Afghan Opium Growers,” The Guardian, May 20, 2012,
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/20/taliban-destroypoppy-afghan-opium.
30 Peters, Gretchen, Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the
Afghan War, (New York, NY: St Martin’s, 2009).
31 Alia Brahimi, “The Taliban’s Evolving Ideology,” London School of Economics Global
Governance Working Paper 02/2010 (July 2010): 9, available at:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/globalGovernance/publications/workingPapers/WP022010.pdf.
32 Emilie Oftedal, “The Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe,” Norwegian
Defence Research Establishment (FFI), January 6, 2015: 16, available at:
http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14-02234.pdf; The use of personal assets was the most
common method of funding.
27

28

6
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss3/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1536

Clarke: Drugs & Thugs

$10,000 to plan.33 The 2004 Madrid train bombings killed 191 people and
injured another 1,600 in an attack financed primarily by the leader of a small,
yet effective, drug trafficking network that smuggled hash from Morocco and
ecstasy from Holland to Spain.34 Relatively small amounts of money could
just as easily be used to plot and conduct a terrorist attack in Western Europe
similar to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January 2015 or the
Copenhagen attacks the following month. And while the Charlie Hebdo
attack was allegedly funded with $20,000 from AQAP, it is easy to see why
some terrorists planning similar types of attacks would follow the Madrid
model–small sums of money collected over time through the use of somewhat
banal criminal activities like drug dealing, various types of fraud, and petty
theft.35 Besides the 2004 Madrid cell, proceeds from drug trafficking are also
suspected of funding another plot against Madrid aimed at the National Court
(2004), the Hofstad Group in Holland (2004), a Swedish cell (2010),
Mohammed Merah’s rampage (2012), and an attack at a kosher supermarket
in Paris (2012).36
Indeed, where the concept of a nexus between crime and terrorism might be
most interesting is the emerging profile of small-time crook to terrorist, a
profile which is now emerging in many of the jihadist attacks and plots
recently targeting Europe. As Williams notes, “with continued politicization
and radicalization of organized crime, instances of transformation from
criminal or drug trafficker to terrorist and from criminal enterprise to
terrorist organization will become more frequent.”37 Abdelhamid Abaaoud,
the leader of the Paris November 2015 attacks, Ahmed Coulibaly, a key figure
in the Charlie Hebdo attacks, and numerous other terrorists were involved in
various forms of criminality before becoming jihadists.38 Mohamed
Oftedal, “The Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe,” 3-7.
Phil Williams, “In Cold Blood: The Madrid Bombings,” Perspectives on Terrorism
(June 2008): 22, available at:
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/50/html. For a
more in-depth analysis of the Madrid bombings, see Phil Williams, “The Madrid Train
Bombings,” in Fighting Back: What Governments Can Do About Terrorism, (Redwood
City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 298-316.
35 Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Rukmini Callimachi, “Disputed Claims Over Qaeda
Role in Paris Attacks,” New York Times, January 14, 2015, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/world/europe/al-qaeda-in-the-arabianpeninsula-charlie-hebdo.html.
36 Oftedal, “The Financing of Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe.”
37 Phil Williams and Joshua T. Hoffman, “Drug Trafficking and Terrorism: Devil’s Brew
or Caffeinated Soda,” Unpublished paper, undated.
38 Simon Cottee, “Reborn Into Terrorism,” The Atlantic, January 25, 2016, available at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/isis-criminalsconverts/426822/. See also, Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “The Islamic State
Creates a New Type of Jihadist: Part Terrorist, Part Gangster,” The Washington Post,
33

34
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Lahouaiej Bouhlel, the terrorist who killed 84 people by driving a truck
through a crowd on Bastille Day in Nice, France, also had a history of petty
crime.39 A study by Edwin Bakker on jihadi terrorists in Europe found that
about a quarter of terrorists sampled in the study had a criminal record while
many had been involved in various forms of crime without having been in
prison or sentenced in a different way.40 A more recent study, focused
strictly on ISIS, found that of 58 individuals linked to 32 ISIS-related plots in
the West between July 2014 and August 2015, 22 percent had a past criminal
record or were in contact with law enforcement. The most common felonies
were related to drugs.41 Finally, recent analysis by Sam Mullins noted that, of
47 cases of jihadist-inspired violence carried out in Western countries
between January 1, 2012 and June 12, 2016, half of the attackers had a
criminal past.42

Are Drugs Funding ISIS?
It is well established that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the
wealthiest terror group in modern history, having built a nascent war chest of
approximately $500 million after looting bank vaults throughout northern
Iraq.43 One of the reasons ISIS has been so successful in financing its
organization has been the group’s ability to earn vast sums of income from
several different revenue streams. To date, two sources of revenue in
particular have provided ISIS with the lion’s share of its wealth–oil and
taxation/extortion. But an outstanding question remains whether ISIS does
now, or may in the future, seek to diversify its activities to include drug
December 20, 2015, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/theislamic-state-creates-a-new-type-of-jihadist-part-terrorist-partgangster/2015/12/20/1a3d65da-9bae-11e5-aca6-1ae3be6f06d2_story.html.
39
Alissa J. Rubin, Lilia Blaise, Adam Nossiter, and Aurelien Breeden, “France Says Truck
Attacker Was Tunisia Native With Record of Petty Crime,” New York Times, July 15,
2016, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/world/europe/attack-nicebastille-day.html.
40 Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the
Circumstances in Which They Joined the Jihad, An Exploratory Study,” (Netherlands
Institute of International Relations: Clingendael, December 2006): 48, available at:
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf.
41 Robin Simcox, “‘We Will Conquer Your Rome’: A Study of Islamic State Terror Plots in
the West,” The Henry Jackson Society, Center for the Response to Radicalisation and
Terrorism (CRT), 2015: 3.
42 Sam Mullins, “The Road to Orlando: Jihadist-Inspired Violence in the West, 20122016,” CTC Sentinel, June 2016: 26-30, available at:
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-road-to-orlando-jihadist-inspired-violence-inthe-west-2012-2016.
43 Daniel L. Glaser, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, U.S. Treasury, “Testimony
of A\S for Terrorist Financing Daniel L. Glaser Before The House Committee on Foreign
Affair's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and House Committee
on Armed Services' Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” June 9, 2016.
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trafficking.44 While there is no current evidence indicating in-depth
involvement in the smuggling or sale of narcotics45, it is important to note
that many ISIS recruits, particularly those from Europe, have relied on drug
trafficking as a means of generating revenue at a low level in what Magnus
Ranstorp has called “micro-financing the Caliphate.”46 It is not necessarily
that the sale of drugs goes directly into ISIS coffers, but proceeds garnered
from peddling narcotics affords jihadists in Europe the financial flexibility to
travel back and forth to Syria as well as to save the money to help procure the
resources necessary for planning a terrorist attack (e.g. weapons, vehicles, cell
phones).
ISIS’s predecessor, Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), was led by a criminal-cum-jihadist
named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose background included street gangs and
prison time for sexual assault.47 Indeed, ISIS seems to attract many jihadists
with a similar profile, including the main link between the Paris November
2015 attacks and the Brussels March 2016 bombings, Salah Abdesalam,
known by his penchant for drinking, smoking, and gambling, rather than his
piety.48 Abdesalam was a regular patron (and brother of the manager) of a
Molenbeek bar named Café del Beguines, a place known for drug dealing and

Eric W. Schoon, “ISIS, Ideology, and the Illicit Drug Economy,” Political Violence @ a
Glance, July 24, 2015, available at:
https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/07/24/isis-ideology-and-the-illicit-drugeconomy/.
45 It should be noted, however, that some allegations have been made. See Damien
Sharkov, “Islamic State Use Drug Trade to Bankroll Their Jihad, Says Spanish
Intelligence,” Newsweek, October 20, 2014, available at:
http://www.newsweek.com/islamic-state-use-drug-trade-bankroll-their-jihad-saysspanish-intelligence-278465; and “High Finance: ISIS Generates Up to $1bn Annually
from Trafficking Afghan Heroin,” RT, March 6, 2015; Tess Owen, “The Islamic State May
Have Gotten Caught Smuggling a Huge Shipment of Opiates to Libya,” Vice News, June
7, 2016, available at: https://news.vice.com/article/the-islamic-state-may-have-gottencaught-smuggling-a-huge-shipment-of-opiates-to-libya; and Tom Porter, “Cocaine
Funding ISIS: Drug Smuggling Profits Islamic State-Linked Jihadists in North Africa,”
International Business Times, November 20, 2014, available at:
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cocaine-funding-isis-drug-smuggling-profits-islamic-statelinked-jihadists-north-africa-1475824.
46 Magnus Ranstorp, “Microfinancing the Caliphate: How the Islamic State is Unlocking
the Assets of European Recruits,” CTC Sentinel, May 25, 2016, available at:
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/microfinancing-the-caliphate-how-the-islamic-stateis-unlocking-the-assets-of-european-recruits.
47 Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic,
July/August 2006, available at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abumusab-al-zarqawi/304983/.
48 Simon Cottee, “Europe’s Joint Smoking, Gay-Club Hopping Terrorists,” Foreign Policy,
April 13, 2016, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/13/the-joint-smokinggay-club-hopping-terrorists-of-molenbeek-abdeslam-radicalization/.
44
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other illicit activity and shuttered after “compromising public security and
tranquility.”49
Involvement in crime, especially drug trafficking, can lead to prison, which in
some cases serves as an incubator for religious radicalization and violent
extremism. As criminals become radicalized, this potentially increases
involvement in the plotting and execution of terrorist attacks.50 A 2012 report
by the European Parliament titled “Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links
Between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the European Union”
noted the prevalence with which jihadist attacks involved links to criminality,
including drug trafficking.51 In some sense, a background in the criminal
underworld left behind for militant Islam can play into the appeal of what has
been called “jihadi cool,” which blends “traditional notions of honor and
virility, but also a strong undercurrent of oppositional, postmodern cool.”52
The modus operandi ISIS has developed for generating foreign fighters and
for relying on smaller cells of attackers to both raise funds and to carry out
attacks external to the main theatre of operations (e.g. in Europe instead of
the Middle East) works particularly well with a local criminal funding model.
This model fits into how ISIS conceives of extra-territorial contributions on a
tactical level. Terrorist organizations other than ISIS may have less of an
affinity for this model, especially those that place a high value on political
coherence and central control, with funds being central to the management of
more disparate elements.53 But for ISIS, this model works extremely well for
several reasons. First, ISIS has less concern than other groups about what
happens outside of the Caliphate. Second, the eschatological stance of ISIS
Andrew Higgins et al., “In Suspects’ Brussels Neighborhood, a History of Petty Crimes
and Missed Chances,” New York Times, November 16, 2015, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/europe/in-suspects-brusselsneighborhood-a-history-of-petty-crimes-and-missed-chances.html.
50 This is not to suggest that jail or prison is the only factor in the radicalization process.
To be sure, this analysis is not meant to be causal, merely a narrative of how some cases
unfold. A robust discussion of the causes of radicalization is beyond the scope of this
article, but suffice to say it results from a combination of economic, social, political,
religious and cultural factors/variables including wide-ranging grievances.
51 Tamara Makarenko, “Increasingly Vulnerable,” The Cipher Brief, April 27, 2016
available at: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/increasingly-vulnerable1089.
52 Simon Cottee, “The Challenge of Jihadi Cool,” The Atlantic, December 24, 2015,
available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/isis-jihadicool/421776/. See also, Thomas Hegghammer, “The Soft Power of Militant Jihad,” New
York Times, December 18, 2015, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/opinion/sunday/militant-jihads-softerside.html.
53 Andrew Liepman and Colin P. Clarke, “Demystifying ISIS,” U.S. News & World Report,
August 23, 2016.
49
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offers a redemptive narrative for petty criminals to carry out terrorist
attacks.54
All of this suggests a real challenge for law enforcement authorities and
intelligence agencies. These entities are already stretched thin and hurting
for resources, concentrating (rightly so) on significant threats like the return
of foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and other jihadist hotspots throughout the
globe. Where these fighters are part of an existing network with roots
stretching back to neighborhoods like Molenbeek, Belgium, the Liselby
district of Fredrikstad in Norway, or the banlieues of Paris, the threat
becomes even more significant. To be sure, ISIS training camps are “the
breeding grounds of tomorrow’s Brussels or Paris attacks.”55
According to a report on foreign fighters by The Soufan Group, European
countries account for a significant percentage of Islamic State recruits from
outside of the Middle East (see Table 1 below). Perhaps even more troubling,
roughly 3700 of the 5,000 plus European Union foreign fighter contingent
come from just four countries–France (1700), Germany (760), Belgium (470)
and the United Kingdom (760).56

Table 1: Estimated Number of Foreign Fighters from European
Countries57
Country
Albania
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia
Denmark
Finland
France

Estimated Number of Foreign
Fighters
90
300
470
330
125
70
1700

Mitch Prothero, “Why Europe Can’t Find the Jihadis in Its Midst,” BuzzFeed News,
August 21, 2016, available at: https://www.buzzfeed.com/mitchprothero/why-europecant-find-the-jihadis-in-its-midst?utm_term=.uu0KYLkw1#.ls4bY469K.
55 Benjamin Bahney et al., “Striking Back at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Pipeline,”
The National Interest, May 31, 2016, available at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/thebuzz/striking-back-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-pipeline-16405.
56 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria
and Iraq,” The Soufan Group, December 2015: 12, available at:
http://soufangroup.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate1.pdf.
57 Ibid., 7-10.
54
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Germany
Ireland
Italy
Kosovo
Macedonia
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom

760
30
87
232
146
220
81
133
300
57
760

So while drugs might not be directly funding ISIS, the sale of drugs (in
addition to other forms of petty crime) by the group’s European recruits
seems noteworthy on several levels. Besides the functional component of
providing jihadists with funds, drug trafficking also puts terrorists in touch
with criminals and helps expand illicit networks, many of which are critical to
the facilitation of a terrorist attack.58 In April 2016, the Director of National
Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Jr., publicly stated that ISIS is operating
clandestine terrorist cells in Britain, Germany, and Italy.59 And although the
director did not go into detail on how these cells were funded, it seems likely
to assume that many of the individuals comprising these cells could be
connected to local criminal elements, including drug traffickers. It is unclear
how many individuals belonging to ISIS are in Europe, but the group has
boasted that it sent “many operatives” to the Continent disguised among the
hordes of refugees that has streamed in over the past several years.60 To be
sure, many are also homegrown.

Timothy Holman, “‘Gonna Get Myself Connected’: The Role of Facilitation in Foreign
Fighter Mobilizations,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 10:2 (2016) available at:
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/497/html.
59 Eric Schmitt and Alissa J. Rubin, “ISIS is Spreading in Europe, U.S. Intelligence Chief
Warns,” New York Times, April 25, 2016, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/us/politics/isis-spreading-in-europe-clapperwarns.html.
60 Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “Tracing the Path of Four Terrorists Sent to
Europe by the Islamic State,” Washington Post, April 22, 2016, available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-europes-migrantcrisis-became-an-opportunity-for-isis/2016/04/21/ec8a7231-062d-4185-bb27cc7295d35415_story.html.
58
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Conclusion
This endemic criminal violence that results from every step of the drug
trafficking value chain erodes state institutions and is often difficult to
reverse. The international community must figure out a way to deal with the
spill-over violence and the human security implications, including refugee
flows, addiction, disease, corruption, and general instability generated from
the illicit trade in illegal narcotics. Where criminal violence should be
considered acutely problematic is in cases where it merges with traditional
forms of political violence like terrorism and insurgency. In these cases,
criminality (and the violence that often accompanies criminality) helps fund
the insurgency and groups can morph over time into criminal-insurgent
hybrids. Moreover, war profiteers disguised as rebels seek to enact strategies
that will serve to prolong the conflict as a means of continuing to reap the
economic benefits, as in conflict zones throughout the globe, from the jungles
of Colombia to the mountains of Afghanistan.
The clearest implication for international security policy is the need to
become more effective at building the capacity of states to combat
transnational organized crime and criminal violence. This can be
accomplished through focusing security cooperation efforts in vulnerable
countries on ministerial capacity, institution building, and defense reform, all
of which are foundational to other forms of capacity, like border control and
anti-corruption efforts.61 Furthermore, ministerial capacity can be improved
even when the partner nation’s absorptive capacity is generally low. This is a
self-reinforcing cycle since ministerial capacity building can itself improve a
partner’s absorptive capacity, thus enabling future capacity building in other
areas. Best practices and lessons learned, gleaned from higher-level strategic
analyses, should be revisited in order to determine potential synergies
applicable to more parochial settings.
Low-level criminality and petty drug dealing are no longer strictly the domain
of local law enforcement. This issue is now a critical counterterrorism
concern. As this article has demonstrated, there are numerous links between
criminality and terrorism, especially in Europe, and numerous ISIS militants
have ties to the illicit underworld and black market. Further probing into
what at first seem like local criminal elements may shed light on broader
networks with connections to terrorist groups in the Middle East and North
Africa. And while the actual “day of attack” cost is low, these cells can be
Walter L. Perry, Defense Institution Building: An Assessment (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2016).
61
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connected to a broader infrastructure and support network like ISIL’s
external operations branch.62
In Europe, preventing attacks like the Paris November 2015 attack and the
Brussels March 2016 attack require local police forces to work closely with
state and European Union officials, better integrating grass roots intelligence
with profiles and backgrounds of individuals that have been identified as
foreign terrorists fighters, especially those seeking to return to Europe. This
will prove to be a major challenge, as many local police departments are
plagued by a shortage of resources. Moreover, the decentralized nature of
some city governments–Brussels has 19 separate administrative police
districts that operate independently and three separate administrations for
the government, NATO, and the EU–make countering crime at any level a
major challenge.63
The onus is on federal and state agencies to work together with local
departments to identify potential areas of concern and help provide the
resources–manpower, training, material–necessary to help mitigate the
threat. To give a sense of the magnitude of the challenge, consider that it
takes a country like France 20 agents to monitor just one suspect for 24 hour
surveillance. France currently has approximately 10,000 names on its “SList,” which is a database of people believed to have been radicalized.64
With sufficient ministerial capacity, countries plagued by high levels of illicit
trade and criminal violence will be better prepared to plan and integrate
strategy and operations against the range of threats arrayed against them.
States need to be better prepared to exploit potential vulnerabilities. In cases
Nicole Magney and Paul Cruickshank, “A View from the CT Foxhole: Adam Szubin,
Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Dept of Treasury,”
CTC Sentinel, August 22, 2016, available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-viewfrom-the-ct-foxhole-adam-szubin-acting-under-secretary-for-terrorism-and-financialintelligence-u-s-dept-of-treasury. See also, Rukmini Callimachi, “How A Secretive
Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers,” New York Times, August 3, 2016,
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-germanrecruit-interview.html; and Eric Schmitt, “As ISIS Loses Land, It Gains Ground In
Overseas Terror,” New York Times, July 3, 2016, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/world/middleeast/isis-terrorism.html.
63 Ian Traynor, “The Language Divide at the Heart of a Split That is Tearing Belgium
Apart,” The Guardian, May 8, 2010, available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/09/belgium-flanders-walloniafrench-dutch.
64 Rukmini Callimachi, “How Do You Stop a Future Terrorist When the Only Evidence is a
Thought?” New York Times, June 21, 2016 available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/world/europe/france-orlando-isis-terrorisminvestigation.html?_r=0.
62
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where terrorists or insurgents are cooperating with criminals, this opens the
door for the possibility of infiltration by law enforcement and intelligence
agents. Along these same lines, states should seek to develop counternarratives that discredit the ideological appeal of terrorists and insurgents by
emphasizing their linkage to common criminality.
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